Abstract. Network and host-based access controls, for example, firewall systems, are important points of security-demarcation, operating as a front-line defence for networks and networked systems. A firewall policy is conventionally defined as a sequence of order-dependant rules, and when a network packet matches with two or more policy rules, the policy is anomalous. Policies for access-control mechanisms may consist of thousands of access-control rules, and correct management is complex and errorprone. We argue that a firewall policy should be anomaly-free by construction, and as such, there is a need for a firewall policy language that allows for constructing, comparing, and composing anomaly-free policies. In this paper, an algebra is proposed for constructing and reasoning about anomaly-free firewall policies. Based on the notion of refinement as safe replacement, the algebra provides operators for sequential composition, union and intersection of policies. The effectiveness of the algebra is demonstrated by its application to anomaly detection, and standards compliance. The effectiveness of the approach in practice is evaluated through a mapping to/from iptables. The algebra is used to specify and reason about iptables firewall policy configurations. A prototype policy management toolkit has been implemented.
Introduction
Firewall policy management is complex and error-prone. A misconfigured policy may permit accesses that were intended to be denied and/or vice-versa. We regard the specification of a firewall policy as a process that evolves, as threats to, and access requirements for, resources behind a firewall do not usually remain static, and over time, a policy or distributed policy configuration may be updated on an ad-hoc basis, possibly by multiple specifiers/administrators. This can be problematic and may introduce anomalies; whereby the intended semantics of the specified access controls become ambiguous.
A firewall policy is conventionally defined as a sequence of order-dependent rules. A rule is composed of filter conditions and a target action. Filter conditions usually consist of fields/attributes from IP, TCP/UDP headers; with the most commonly used attributes being source/destination IP/port, and network protocol. Target actions are usually allow or deny. When a network packet matches with two or more policy rules, the policy is anomalous [2, 10] .
A firewall policy may be developed as a collection of independent or related specifications that an administrator will need to replace by a policy that adequately captures the requirements of the individual specifications. A configuration may need to be updated with additional policy specifications when a new threat is identified, or when a new permissible access is required. Therefore, having a consistent means of composing these specifications is desirable. The objective of this paper is to develop a theory about composing anomaly-free firewall policies. When a policy is anomaly-free, there is no ambiguity as to whether a given network packet is allowed or denied by the firewall. Our goal is to provide an algebra where policies are anomaly-free by construction. Example 1. When configuring the rules that define a firewall policy, the specifier must understand the relationship of each rule to every other rule in the policy. Consider, as a running example, a company that employs a team of administrators and a team of developers. There are two network security policy requirements, whereby network traffic destined to the IP range [1 . . 3] on ports [1 . . 3] is to be allowed from the administrators, and traffic destined to the IP range [2 . . 4] on ports [2 . . 4] is to be allowed from the developers. For ease of exposition, we give the IPs as natural numbers, and the IP and port ranges as intervals of N. For simplicity, we do not consider the source IP ranges for the administrators and the developers.
Specifying The Requirements. System Administrator Bob manages the network access controls for the administration and development teams. He specifies the network security policy requirement for the administration team as: Pol Admin == (1, [1 . . 3] , [1 . . 3] , allow) , whereby 1 is the position of the rule in the policy, the first instance of [1 . . 3] is the required destination IP range, the second instance of [1 . . 3] is the required destination port range, and allow, means that network traffic matching this pattern is permitted traversal of the firewall. Similarly, for the development team, he specifies: Pol Dev == (1, [2 . .
4], [2 . . 4], allow)
. Bob needs to combine Pol Admin and Pol Dev into a single firewall policy, and security requirements may change. He requires a consistent means of composing firewall policies, whereby the result is anomaly-free and upholds the enforcements of each policy involved in the composition. This approach, however, does not does yield the desired result. That is, in the above specification (Pol Admin Pol Dev ), the rule at position 1 allows some of the IP/port pairs allowed by the rule at position 2 and vice-versa. Therefore, the policy is anomalous. From this, we have that the naïve sequential composition of rules is not a consistent operation when specifying an anomaly-free policy.
A Flattening Approach. To specify the firewall policy, Bob considers the approach whereby for each IP/port pair allowed by the company's network security policy requirements, there is a rule to allow each IP/port pair. He specifies: (1, 
4], allow)
. This policy does provide the desired result, in that it is both anomaly-free and consistent with the two network security policy requirements involved in the composition. We observe however, that this approach is tedious, error-prone and not practical for large numbers of IPs/ports or large numbers of policy rules.
A Different Approach. Bob is required to specify the firewall policy whereby policy rules allow the IP/port-range pairs from either Pol Admin or Pol Dev . To specify the policy for the company, he decides to compose the two requirements into a single requirement as follows: (1, [1 . . 4] , [1 . . 4] , allow) . This approach, however, is inconsistent with the two network security policy requirements outlined by the company. That is, the result of composition is an overly-permissive firewall policy, whereby network traffic is permitted to IP 1 on port 4, and to IP 4 on port 1. Conversely, this approach would result in an overly-restrictive policy if the rules had a target action of deny.
A Better Approach. Bob is required to specify the firewall policy whereby the desired result is the smallest number of anomaly-free rules that allow all the IP/port pairs from either Pol Admin or Pol Dev . He specifies the policy: ( [4 . . 4] , allow) . In this case, the result is as desired, as it is the smallest number of anomaly-free rules that allow all the IP/port pairs from either Pol Admin or Pol Dev .
Mutual Policy Enforcements. Bob receives a request to configure the policy that allows the IP/port pairs from both Pol Admin and Pol Dev . He specifies: (1, [2 . . 3] , [2 . . 3] , allow) . In this case, the specification provides the desired result, and defines the smallest number of anomaly-free rules that allow all the IP/port pairs from both Pol Admin and Pol Dev . We observe that the resulting policy upholds the restrictions of both Pol Admin and Pol Dev .
Conflicting Policy Decisions. Suppose, for example, the policy rules specified were: (1, For an administrator, it may be relatively straightforward to understand policy composition where only a small number of rules are involved, however, this does not scale. We argue that to reason confidently a policy or distributed policy configuration is anomaly-free and adequately mitigates the identified threats; a common framework is required, whereby knowledge related to detailed access control configurations and standards-based firewall policies can be represented and reasoned about.
In this paper, we present a firewall policy algebra FW 1 for constructing and reasoning over anomalyfree policies. The algebra allows policies to be composed in such a way, that the result upholds the access requirements of each policy involved; and permits one to reason as to whether some policy is a safe (secure) replacement for another policy in the sense of [19, 20, 28] . In this paper, when one policy is considered a safe (secure) replacement for another, then this means that the former is no less restrictive than the latter. The proposed algebra is used to reason about iptables firewall policy configurations. We derive a filter condition specification for FW 1 from a collection of attributes expressible in firewall rules from the iptables filter table. iptables is a command line utility used to define policies for the Linux kernel firewall Netfilter [43] . We focus on stateful and stateless firewall policies that are defined in terms of constraints on source and destination IP and port ranges, the TCP, UDP and ICMP protocols, and additional filter condition attributes. Note, the notion of state in iptables is an abstraction, where given literals signify user-land 'states' that packets within tracked connections can be related to.
The primary contribution of this paper is an algebra FW 1 , that can be used to reason about firewall policies using refinement and composition operators. The effectiveness of the algebra is demonstrated by using it to characterise anomalies in firewall policies and to define standards compliance. The effectiveness of the approach in practice is evaluated through a mapping to/from iptables. The evaluation shows that the approach is practical for large policies. This paper is a revised and extended version of the work in [37] . In the sequel, we encode additional filtering specifications in FW 1 , in particular, for OSI Layer 2 packet-types and MAC addresses, OSI Layer 7 Linux UIDs and GIDs, and Application layer protocols recognisable by iptables. We also develop a definition for time-based filtering rules. We include new definitions for anomaly detection through policy composition, and describe how to incorporate an additional target action of 'log' for firewall rules in the algebra. An extended definition for firewall rule (duplet datatype) ordering, as well as implementation definitions for duplet join and difference are given.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we specify the core filter condition specification for rules in the FW 1 algebra. The specification is derived from filter condition attributes expressible in firewall rules for the iptables filter table. Section 3 introduces the notion of adjacency, which is at the heart of reasoning about/composing firewall rules that involve IP/port ranges. In Section 4 we define datatypes for firewall rule attributes, such as IP/port ranges. Section 5 defines the firewall policy algebra FW 1 . In Section 6, we use FW 1 to reason about firewall policies in practice. Section 7 describes a prototype policy management toolkit for iptables and presents some preliminary results. Related work is outlined in Section 8 and Section 9 concludes the paper. The Z notation [42] is used to provide a consistent syntax for structuring and presenting the definitions and examples in this paper. We use only those parts of Z that can be intuitively understood and Appendix A gives a brief overview of the notation used. Mathematical definitions have been syntax-and type-checked using the f UZZ tool.
Attributes of a Linux-based Firewall
In this section, the core filter condition attributes used to define firewall rules in the FW 1 firewall algebra are formally specified. Attributes are derived from the Data Link, Network, Transport and Application Layers of the OSI model. Additional filter condition attributes are also defined. Attribute definitions are extended in Section 4 to specify range-based filter conditions used to define firewall rules in the FW 1 policy algebra. The attributes defined in this paper are based on the expressiveness on the iptables firewall. The following example demonstrates the specification of a firewall rule using the iptables command-line syntax. table is the default table for iptables, therefore it is not necessary to include the (-t filter) option when specifying a firewall rule.
Data Link Layer Filtering
Packet-type. iptables allows for the specification of firewall rules that filter the type of packet at the Data Link layer of the OSI model. Let PktTpe be the set of Data Link-layer packet types, whereby:
Media Access Control (MAC) Addresses. iptables allows for constructing firewall rules that filter the MAC address of a Ethernet device at the Data Link layer of the OSI model. Filtering is applied to source MAC addresses entering the FORWARD or INPUT chains of the filter table [43] . Let basic type MAC be the set of all MAC addresses. We define:
[MAC]
For simplicity, we do not consider how the values of MAC may be constructed, other than to assume that the usual human-readable notation can be used, such as 00:0F:EA:91:04:08 and 00:0F:EA:91:04:09 ∈ MAC.
Network Layer Filtering
IP Addresses. iptables allows the specification of firewall rules that filter the source/destination IP address of a network packet. For simplicity, we consider only the IPv4 address range, as a firewall rule with an IPv6 address filter condition attribute must be specified using ip6tables; the equivalent IPv6 firewall [25] . In this paper, IP addresses as encoded using natural numbers, as there is a logical mapping from IPs to natural numbers, and a logical mapping from IP ranges and CIDR blocks to intervals of N. This is done for ease of exposition, and to exploit the natural ordering of over N. We define the constant maxIP, whereby:
ICMP. iptables allows for filtering by ICMP Type and Code. Let TypesCodes be the set of all valid ICMP Type/Code pairs, as detailed in [40] . Most Type/Code pairs i, j ∈ N are given as (i, j) ∈ TypesCodes, for example, (8, 0) is an ICMP Echo Request, however, some ICMP Types i ∈ N; for example, Type 19 (reserved for security), have no ICMP Code, and are given as (i, −1) ∈ TypesCodes. Note, for ease of exposition we use syntactic sugar in the definition of TypesCodes as a free-type.
Transport Layer Filtering
Network Ports. A network port is a communication end-point used by the Transport layer protocols (for example, TCP/UDP) of the OSI model. iptables allows for constructing firewall rules that filter by source/destination ports. A port is a 16-bit unsigned integer. We define the constant maxPrt, where:
UDP. iptables allows the specification of firewall rules that filter UDP traffic. Let UDP define the set of packet values for the UDP protocol; whereby 1 signifies that a packet is using UDP or 0 signifies it is not. We define:
UDP ::= 1 | 0 TCP. iptables allows for TCP firewall rules to be constructed using a pair of TCP flags specifications. The first, specifies the flags that are to be examined in a packet-header, and the second specifies the flags that are to be set in a packet-header, these are the mask and comp values for a TCP packet [25] . Let Flags be the set of TCP flags filterable in an iptables rule (as a mask or a comp specification), whereby:
and let Flag Spec be the set of all (mask, comp) pairs, we define:
Application Layer Filtering
Layer 7 Protocol Filtering. iptables allows for constructing firewall rules that filter certain protocols at the Application Layer of the OSI model. Let Proto L 7 be the set of all OSI Application-layer protocols recognised by iptables [33] . Note, for ease of exposition we use syntactic sugar in the definition of Proto L 7 as a free-type. We define:
The Layer 7 protocol definitions specify how these protocol names correspond to regular expressions that are matched by Netfilter on the packet application layer data. For example, the following regular expression [32] :
is used by the Netfilter firewall to match packets that are part of FTP traffic.
Packet-owner/creator Filtering. For locally generated packets; iptables allows filtering by various characteristics of the packet creator through the owner module. Filtering is applied to the OUTPUT chain of the filter table [43] . We define the constant maxUID for 32-Bit Linux UIDs, where:
Similarly, the constant maxGID for 32-Bit Linux GIDs is defined as:
Additional Filtering Specifications
State. The iptables conntrack module defines the state extension [43] . The state extension allows access to the connection tracking state for a packet. Let State be the set of connection tracking states for a packet/connection.
Time-based Filtering. iptables allows for a filtering decision to be made if the packet arrival time/date is within a given range. The possible time range expressible in a rule is 1970-01-01T00:00:00 to 2038-01-19T04:17:07 [16] , and is specified in ISO 8601 "T" notation. We define the constant maxTime, whereby T (date) is a function that converts a date specified in "T" notation to a Unix timestamp:
maxTime == T (2038-01-19T04:17:07)
Network Interfaces and Direction-oriented Filtering. iptables allows for a filtering decision to be made with respect to the interface the packet is arriving at/leaving through. Let basic type IFACE be the set of all interfaces on a machine, where for simplicity, we assume elements of IFACE resemble lo, eth0, wlan0, tun0, etc. We define:
[IFACE]
Network traffic can be inbound or outbound on an interface. Direction-oriented filtering is defined as Dir, whereby:
Dir ::= ingress | egress iptables Chains. Let Chain be the set of chains for the iptables filter table, we define:
A Theory of Adjacency
Range-based filter condition attributes (for example, IPs/ports) have logical mappings to intervals of N. For example, the port range that includes all ports from SSH upto and including HTTP can be written as the interval [22 . . 80].
Example 3. Consider, as part of a running example, a system that is capable of enforcing firewall rules whereby the filter condition attribute for the rules is a destination port range only. A rule that allowed all ports from SSH to HTTP would be: (i, [22 . . 80], allow), where i is the index of the rule in the policy, [22 . . 80] is the required port range, and allow means that network traffic matching this pattern is permitted. Suppose we had a second rule, that specifies allow everything from Quote Of The Day (QOTD) up to and including FTP Control, then (j, [17 . . 21] , allow) specifies that for the rule at index j; the required port range [17 . . 21] is allowed. Intuitively we can see that the port ranges for the rules at index i and index j are adjacent, and we may want to join rule i and rule j into a single rule that looks like (k, [17 . . 80], allow). This notion of adjacency becomes more complex when we consider comparing/composing firewall rules comprising two or more filter condition attributes.
The Adjacency Specification
In this section we define the filter condition attribute relationships of adjacency, disjointness and subsumption. These can be applied to any ordered set, not just number intervals. These relationships are at the heart of adjacency, and ultimately the FW 1 algebra.
Let IV[min, max] be the set of all intervals on the natural numbers, from min up to and including max. Intervals are defined by their corresponding sets. 
Similarly, let Port define the set of all possible network port ranges, whereby:
Adjacency. The relation ( ) defines adjacency over any ordered set. Adjacency is a general notion that is not limited to N. We generalize adjacency to any attribute of generic type X, whereby for a, b ∈ X, if a X b, then a and b are adjacent in the set X. The property of reflexivity is required as any a ∈ X should be adjacent to itself, that is; if for any a, that a X a did not hold, then an inconsistency would exist. Symmetry follows from a similar requirement, where for a, b ∈ X, if a is adjacent to b in X, then b must also be adjacent to a in X. The following schema defines a generic adjacency relation that can be instantiated for adjacency over different datatypes.
[X]
:
Given a set S ∈ P X, then the transitive closure of the adjacency relation for elements in S is defined as follows.
Interval Adjacency. Two intervals on the set of natural numbers are adjacent if their union defines a single interval. For a given maximum value max ∈ N, we define:
Number Adjacency. Two numbers are adjacent if they are the same or if they are different by a value of one. We define:
Set Adjacency. For a generic type X, and sets S, T ∈ P X, then S and T are adjacent, as S ∪ T ∈ P X. We define:
Disjointness. The relation ( | ) is used to define the notion of disjointness over any ordered set. Given a, b ∈ X, a | X b denotes a and b are disjoint in X. The property of irreflexivity is required, as a cannot be disjoint from itself, that is; if for any a, that ¬ (a | X a) did not hold, then an inconsistency would exist. Symmetry is also required for consistency, as if a and b are disjoint in X, then b and a must be disjoint in X also. The following schema defines a generic disjointness relation that can be instantiated for disjointness over different datatypes.
Interval Disjointness. Two intervals are disjoint if they don't intersect. For a given maximum value max ∈ N, we define:
Number Disjointness. Two numbers are disjoint if they are different. We define:
Set Disjointness. Two sets are disjoint if they don't intersect. We define:
Reflexivity is required, as any a must cover itself. Transitivity follows from a similar requirement, where for a, b, c ∈ X, if a covers b and b covers c, then a must cover c. Antisymmetry follows from the assumption of irredundant elements, where if a covers b and b covers a then one of them is unnecessary [13] . The properties of reflexivity, transitivity and antisymmetry define X ← as a non-strict partial order over X [5] . The following schema defines a generic subsumption relation that can be instantiated for subsumption over different datatypes.
Some subsumption orderings (for example, subset) may form a lattice with greatest lower bound (glb) ∩ X and least upper bound (lub) ∪ X operators for values in X.
Interval Subsumption. An interval I subsumes (covers) an interval J, if J ⊆ I. For a given maximum value max ∈ N, we define:
Number Subsumption. For a, b ∈ N then b covers a if a equals b. We define:
The equality relation is both symmetric and antisymmetric, and defines both an equivalence relation and a non-strict partial order. Thus, a N ← b denotes that b subsumes/covers a.
Set Subsumption. The definition for set subsumption is as expected, we define:
For a generic type X, and S ∈ P X, then the flattening function S gives the cover-set for the elements of S, whereby the cover-set of S has no subsumption. We define:
Given the set of all intervals on the natural numbers from 1 . . 3, then we have:
We define a difference operator for S, T ∈ P X, where S \ P X T gives the relative compliment of T in S. That is, everything that is of type X that is covered in S, but not in T. We define this as:
Example 9. Given the cover-set for the set of all intervals on the natural numbers from 1 . . 3, and the
The Adjacency Datatype
For a generic type X, the Adjacency datatype α[X], is the set of all closed subsets of X partitioned by adjacency.
Example 10. We can use this to define all ways that an interval can be partitioned into sets of nonadjacent intervals.
Let IP Spec define the set of all closed subsets for the intervals of the IPv4 address range, partitioned by adjacency, and similarly, let Prt Spec define the set of all closed subsets for the intervals of the network port range, partitioned by adjacency. We define:
Adjacency Datatype Ordering. An ordering can be defined over Adjacency-sets of a generic type X as follows:
Lemma 3.1. The ordering relation is a non-strict partial order over α [X] .
T means that T covers S, that is, every a ∈ S is covered by some b ∈ T. The ordering relation , is defined as a subsumption ordering/an antisymmetric preorder, where the properties of reflexivity, transitivity and antisymmetry hold for over α[X] as ( X ← ) is a non-strict partial order for elements of type X. We have:
The elements ⊥, ∈ α[X] define the least and greatest bounds, respectively, on α[X], where ⊥ is the unique minimal element that is covered by all elements, and is the unique maximal element that covers all other elements. We have:
Example 11. Given ranges 1 , ranges 2 ∈ IP Spec , where: Adjacency Datatype Union. The join of S, T ∈ α[X] is defined using subsumption, as the generalized intersection of all Adjacency-sets, where each element of (S ⊕ T) covers an element in either S or T. Intuitively, this means that the values of the join are exactly a union of the elements from both S and T. Proof The generalized intersection in the join operation for some S, T ∈ α[X] defines the smallest collection of x ∈ X that cover all of the elements from both S and T by subsumption. If we take some
Thus, Adjacency join provides a lowest upper bound operator. Since ⊕ provides a lub operator we have S (S ⊕ T) and T (S ⊕ T).
Adjacency Datatype Intersection. Under this ordering, the meet, or intersection S ⊗ T of S, T ∈ α[X] is defined using subsumption, as the cover-set for the generalized union of all Adjacency-sets, where each element of (S ⊗ T) is covered by an element in both S and T. Intuitively, this means that the values of the meet are all non-empty intersections of each value in S with each value in T. Proof It follows from Lemma 3.2 by an analogous argument that Corollary 3.3 holds.
Since ⊗ provides the glb operator, then for S, T ∈ α[X] we have S ⊗ T is covered by both S and T, that is (S ⊗ T) S and (S ⊗ T) T.
where not S is the cover-set for all elements of type X that are not covered by some member of S. We have:
forms a lattice with lowest-upper, and greatest lower bound operators, ⊕ and ⊗ respectively, and complement operator not.
Proof This follows from the definition of as a subsumption ordering/an antisymmetric preorder, the properties of not, the definition of the meet as the cover-set for the generalized union of all Adjacencysets, where for S, T ∈ α[X], each element of (S ⊗ T) is covered by an element in both S and T, and the definition of the join as the generalized intersection of all Adjacency-sets, where each element of (S ⊕ T) covers an element in either S or T.
The Duplet Datatype
The notion of adjacency becomes more complex when we consider comparing/composing firewall rules comprising two or more filter condition attributes. When joining adjacent firewall rules, in some cases the rules may coalesce and in other cases they may partition into a number of disjoint rules.
Example 12.
Recall from Example 3 in this section, the firewall system that supports only destination port range filter conditions. Suppose we want to extend the expressiveness of the policy rules for this system to include a definition for destination IP range. Consider, two policy requirements; whereby network traffic is to be allowed to the IP range [1 . . Then modelling this using adjacency-free IP/port range pairs, we have p 1 , p 2 ∈ (IP Spec × Prt Spec ), whereby: Table 1 A two-attribute rule join, 1 st attribute major ordering If we consider the attributes separately, we observe that the IP range in p 1 is adjacent to the IP range in p 2 , and the port ranges in p 1 and p 2 are also adjacent. However, in composing p 1 and p 2 under a lowestupper-bound style operation one cannot simply take a union of the sets of intervals to be the IP/port range pair:
, as this results in an overly permissive policy, given that network traffic is permitted to IP 1 on port 4, and to IP 4 on port 1 as a result of composition. Conversely, this would result in an overly restrictive policy if we were composing deny rules.
When we consider how the join of p 1 and p 2 may be defined, whereby the desired result is the smallest number of non-adjacent rules that cover both p 1 and p 2 , then we can apply an adjacency-precedence to the IP ranges in p 1 and p 2 , and observe that the port ranges in p 1 and p 2 are not disjoint. We refer to this as the 1 st attribute major ordering, and the cover for p 1 and p 2 is given as:
In this case, the result is a set of disjoint rules that exactly cover the IP/port-range pair constraints from p 1 and p 2 . We note, however, that instead, the adjacency-precedence may be applied to the second attribute, where in this case we observe that the port ranges in p 1 and p 2 are adjacent, and the IP ranges in p 1 and p 2 are not disjoint. We refer to this as a 2 nd attribute major ordering, and would therefore expect the set of disjoint rules that exactly cover the IP/port-range pair constraints from p 1 and p 2 to be:
The resulting operations for the 1 st attribute major ordering are illustrated in Table 1 , whereby the label R signifies the new rule, and the label A means filter condition attribute. In Table 2 , the operations for the 2 nd attribute major ordering the are encoded. For the remainder of this paper, we consider firewall rule join in terms of the 1 st attribute major ordering. However, we also consider the join of rules where there is an adjacency in other than the first attribute, we refer to this type of adjacency as forward adjacency. 
gives the set of all duplets for adjacency-free IP/port-range pairs. 
, we define forward adjacency, whereby:
Duplet Adjacency. A pair of duplets a, b ∈ δ[X, Y] are adjacent, if the attributes in the first coordinate are adjacent, and the attributes in the second coordinate are not disjoint, or a and b are forward adjacent. 
Duplet Disjointness. A pair of duplets are disjoint if the attributes in the first coordinate are disjoint, and/or the attributes in the second coordinate are disjoint.
Duplet Intersection. The definition for duplet intersection is defined as the intersection of the attributes in each coordinate under their respective orderings.
Example 17. For p 1 and p 2 , we have
Duplet Merge. The definition for duplet merge is defined as the union of the attributes in each coordinate under their respective orderings. For (a 1 , b 1 
Example 18. Given p 1 and p 2 , we have
Thus, we define duplet subsumption as:
Precedence Subsumption. A precedence subsumption is defined for duplets, whereby we explicitly define subsumption orderings separately in each coordinate. The relation ( → ) defines a general format for precedence subsumption over any ordered set. For a, b ∈ X, if a X → b, then a covers b by precedence in X. The properties of reflexivity, transitivity and antisymmetry define X → as a non-strict partial order over X [5] . The following schema defines a generic precedence subsumption relation that can be instantiated for precedence subsumption over different datatypes.
, if a 1 covers a 2 in X, and b 2 covers b 1 in Y. Thus, we define precedence subsumption as:
Precedence Cover. For a duplet a ∈ δ[X, Y] and a set of duplets S ∈ P δ[X, Y], then S covers a if the duplet merge of all elements in S that each cover a by precedence subsumption, cover a by duplet subsumption. We define:
, we have:
Intersecting Elements. For a ∈ δ[X, Y] and S ∈ P δ[X, Y], then a S is the set of all non-empty intersections of a with each value b ∈ S. We define:
Duplet Adjacency Ordering
In this section, an ordering is defined for Adjacency-sets of duplets.
T is the cover-set for the set of all duplets covered in S by a duplet, or by a collection of duplets, and not covered in T. Thus, we define the difference of Adjacency-sets of duplets as:
, where:
The implementation definition for duplet difference is given in Section 7.2.
Duplet Adjacency
Ordering. An ordering can be defined over Adjacency-sets of duplets as follows:
, then S T means that T covers S, that is, every a ∈ S is covered under duplet subsumption, either by a duplet, or by a collection of duplets in T. The ordering relation , is defined as an antisymmetric preorder, where the properties of reflexivity, transitivity and antisymmetry hold for over
, we have for a ∈ S, then a covers itself under duplet subsumption. Since S is adjacency-free, then every duplet in S covers only itself under a duplet subsumption in S. Since duplet subsumption is reflexive, then is reflexive; that is:
, such that T U, then all b ∈ T are covered in U under duplet subsumption. Therefore, all a ∈ S are covered in U under duplet subsumption as duplet subsumption is transitive. Then is transitive; that is:
, then S T if all a ∈ S are covered in T under duplet subsumption, and if T S then all b ∈ T are covered in S under duplet subsumption. Therefore, from the definition of duplet subsumption, if S T and T S then T = S. Then is antisymmetric; that is:
define the least and greatest bounds, respectively, on
, where ⊥ is the unique minimal element that is covered by all elements, and is the unique maximal element that covers all other elements. We have:
Then we have:
Thus, is a non-strict partial order over
Example 24. Adjacency Duplet Union. The join of S, T ∈ α[δ[X, Y]] is defined using subsumption, as the cover-set for the duplet merge of the transitive closure of adjacent duplets, from the generalized intersection of all sets of sets of duplets, whereby each element of the generalized intersection covers an element in either S or T by duplet precedence subsumption. The generalized intersection defines the smallest collection of duplets that cover all of the duplets from both S and T by precedence subsumption. Given that all duplets in this set are now disjoint, the cover-set for the duplet merge of the transitive closure of adjacent duplets merges any forward-adjacent duplets from S and T. If we take some
Thus, Adjacency join provides a lowest upper bound operator, we have: The implementation definition for duplet adjacency-set join is given in Section 7.2.
Adjacency Duplet Intersection. Under this ordering, the meet (S ⊗ T) of S, T ∈ α[δ[X, Y]] is defined using subsumption, as the cover-set for the generalized union of all Adjacency-sets, where each element of (S ⊗ T) is covered by a duplet, or by a collection of duplets in both S and T. The meet is defined as the largest set of adjacency-free duplets that is covered by both S and T. Thus, ⊗ provides the glb operator, then for S, T ∈ α[δ[X, Y]] we have S ⊗ T is covered by both S and T, that is (S ⊗ T) S and (S ⊗ T) T.
where not S is the cover-set for all elements of type X that are not covered by some member of S. We have: Proof This follows from the definition of as an antisymmetric preorder, the properties of not, and the definitions of ⊕ and ⊗.
Commutative Laws. We observe that changing the order of the operands/Adjacency-sets does not change the composition result.
Associative Laws. We observe that the order in which the operations are performed does not change the outcome of the operation.
The following identities link ⊕ and ⊗.
, S is idempotent with respect to ⊕ and ⊗.
is a lattice, ⊥ is the identity element for the join operation ⊕, and is the identity element for the meet operation ⊗.
Distributivity Laws. The join operation distributes over the meet operation and vice-versa.
FW 1 Filter Conditions
In this section, the filter condition attribute datatypes for the FW 1 policy model are defined.
OSI Layer 2. Let L 2 define the set of all additional filter condition attributes at the Data-Link Layer, given as the set of all duplets over the set of all sets of packet-types (P PktTpe) and the set of all sets of MAC addresses (P MAC).
From Lemma 3.5, we have that L 2 is a lattice. , the set of all closed subsets for the ranges of all Linux UIDs partitioned by adjacency (UID Spec ), and the set of all closed subsets for the ranges of all Linux GIDs (GID Spec ) partitioned by adjacency.
From Lemma 3.5, we have that L 7 is a lattice. The Stateful/Protocol Datatype. Let Protocol define the set of all stateful protocols, given as the set of all duplets over the TCP protocol (P Flag Spec ), the UDP protocol (UDP), the ICMP protocol (P TypesCodes), and the set of all sets of connection tracking states for a packet/connection (P State).
Protocol 
Additional Filtering Specifications. Let AdditionalFC define the set of all additional filter condition attributes of interest, given as the set of all duplets over the set of all closed subsets for the ranges of all Unix timestamps, from 0 up to and including maxTime (Time Spec ), the set of all sets of all network interfaces on a machine (P IFACE), the set of all sets of directions for direction-oriented filtering (P Dir) and the set of all sets of iptables chains (P Chain).
From Lemma 3.5, we have that AdditionalFC is a lattice. A filter condition is a eight-tuple (s, sprt, d, dprt, p, l 2 , l 7 , a), representing network traffic originating from source IP ranges s, with source port ranges sprt, destined for destination IP ranges d, with destination port ranges dprt, using stateful-protocols p, with additional Layer 2 attributes l 2 , additional Layer 7 attributes l 7 and additional filtering specifications a. Let FC define the set of all filter conditions, whereby:
From Lemma 3.5, we have that FC is a lattice.
. A pair of filter conditions are forward adjacent if the attributes in the first coordinate are equal, and there is one adjacent attribute in the second coordinate, while all other attributes in the second coordinate are equal.
The FW 1 Firewall Algebra
In this section we define an algebra FW 1 , for constructing and reasoning about anomaly-free firewall policies. We focus on stateless and stateful firewall policies that are defined in terms of constraints on source/destination IP/port ranges, the TCP, UDP and ICMP protocols, and additional filter condition attributes. A firewall policy defines the filter conditions that may be allowed or denied by a firewall. Let Policy define the set of all firewall policies, whereby:
A firewall policy (A, D) ∈ Policy defines a policy as a pair of adjacency-free sets of filter conditions under the duplet adjacency ordering, whereby a filter condition f ∈ A should be allowed by the firewall, while a filter condition f ∈ D should be denied. Given (A, D) ∈ Policy then A and D are disjoint: this avoids any contradiction in deciding whether a filter condition should be allowed or denied. The policy destructor functions allow and deny are analogous to functions first and second for ordered pairs:
Thus, we have for all P ∈ Policy then P = (allow(P), deny(P)).
Lemma 5.1. Policy defines the set of anomaly-free policies.
Proof Given a policy (A, D) ∈ Policy, as A and D are adjacency-free sets, then A has no redundancy and D has no redundancy, as Adjacency-sets have no subsumption. Therefore, all packets matched in filter conditions allowed by the policy are distinct, as are all packets matched in filter conditions that are denied by the policy. Given a policy P ∈ Policy, as allow(P) and deny(P) are disjoint, then P has no shadowing.
As P has no subsumption and P has no shadowing, then P has no generalised filter conditions and P has no correlated filter conditions. Therefore, as P has no redundancy/shadowing/generalisation/correlation, then Policy defines the set of anomaly-free policies.
Note that (A, D) ∈ Policy need not partition FC : the allow and deny sets define the filter conditions to which the policy explicitly applies, and an implicit default decision is applied for those filter conditions in FC \ α [FC] (A ⊕ D) . For the purposes of modelling iptables firewalls it is sufficient to assume default deny, though we observe that FW 1 can also be used to reason about default allow firewall policies.
Policy Refinement. An ordering can be defined over firewall policies, whereby given P, Q ∈ Policy then P Q means that P is no less restrictive than Q, that is, any filter condition that is denied by Q is denied by P. Intuitively, policy P is considered to be a safe replacement for policy Q, in the sense of [19, 20, 28] and any firewall that enforces policy Q can be reconfigured to enforce policy P without any loss of security. The set Policy forms a lattice under the safe replacement ordering and is defined as follows.
Formally, P Q iff every filter condition allowed by P is allowed by Q and that any filter conditions explicitly denied by Q are also explicitly denied by P. Note that in this definition we distinguish between filter conditions explicitly denied in the policy versus those implicitly denied by default. This means that, everything else being equal, a policy that explicitly denies a filter condition is considered more restrictive than a policy that relies on the implicit default-deny for the same network traffic pattern. Safe replacement is defined as the Cartesian product of Adjacency orderings over allow and deny sets and it therefore follows that (Policy, ) is a poset. ⊥ and define the most restrictive and least restrictive policies, that is, for any P ∈ Policy we have ⊥ P . Thus, for example, any firewall enforcing a policy P can be safely reconfigured to enforce the (not very useful) firewall policy ⊥. Proof The ordering of adjacency-free filter condition/duplets is a lattice under subsumption, the Cartesian product is a lattice under the definitions of glb and lub, therefore, FW 1 is a lattice.
Policy Intersection. Under this ordering, the meet P Q, of two firewall policies P and Q is defined as the policy that denies any filter condition that is explicitly denied by either P or Q, but allows filter conditions that are allowed by both P and Q. Intuitively, this means that if a firewall is required to enforce both policies P and Q, it can be configured to enforce the policy (P Q) since P Q is a safe replacement for both P and Q, that is; (P Q) P and (P Q) Q. Given the definition of safe replacement as a product of two Adjacency lattices, it follows that the policy meet provides the glb operator. Thus, P Q provides the 'best'/least restrictive safe replacement (under ) for both P and Q.
Policy Union. The join of two firewall policies P and Q is defined as the policy that allows any filter condition allowed by either P or Q, but denies filter conditions that are explicitly denied by both P and Q. Intuitively, this means that a firewall that is required to enforce either policy P or Q can be safely configured to enforce the policy (P Q). Since provides a lub operator we have P (P Q) and Q (P Q).
Constructing Firewall Policies
The lattice of policies FW 1 provides us with an algebra for constructing and interpreting firewall polices. The following constructor functions are used to build primitive policies. Given a set of adjacencyfree filter conditions A, then (Allow A) is a policy that allows filter conditions in A, and (Deny D) is a policy that explicitly denies filter conditions in D.
Allow,
This provides what we refer to as a weak interpretation of allow and deny. Network traffic patterns that are not explicitly mentioned in parameter S are default-deny and therefore are not specified in the deny set of the policy. The following provides us with a strong interpretation for these constructors:
In this case (Allow + A) allows filter conditions specified in A, while explicitly denying all other filter conditions, and (Deny + D) denies filter conditions specified in D while allowing all other filter conditions. A firewall policy P ∈ Policy can be decomposed into its corresponding allow and deny sets, and re-constructed using the algebra; for any (A, D) ∈ Policy, since A and D are disjoint then: 
Reasoning About Policies in Practice
Sequential Composition. A firewall policy is conventionally constructed as a sequence of rules, whereby for a given network packet, the decision to allow or deny the packet is checked against each policy rule, starting from the first, in sequence, and the first rule that matches gives the result that is returned. The algebra FW 1 can be extended to include a similar form of sequential composition of policies. The policy constructions in Section 5.1 can be regarded as representing the individual rules of a conventional firewall policy.
Let (Allow A) o 9 Q denote a sequential composition of an allow rule (Allow A) with policy Q with the interpretation that a given network packet matched in A is allowed; if it does not match in A then policy Q is enforced. The resulting policy either: allows filter conditions in A (and denies all other filter conditions), or allows/denies filter conditions in accordance with policy Q. We define:
which is as expected. A similar definition can be provided for the sequential composition (Deny D) o 9 Q, whereby a given network packet that is matched in D is denied; if it does not match in D then policy Q is enforced. We define:
While in practice its usual to write a firewall policy in terms of many constructions of allow and deny rules, in principle, any firewall policy P ∈ Policy can be defined in terms of one allow policy (Allow allow(P)) and one deny policy (Deny deny(P)) and since the allow and deny sets of P are disjoint we have P : Policy × Policy → Policy ∀ FW 1 ; P, Q : Policy • P o 9 Q = (Deny + (deny(P))) (Q (Allow + (allow(P))))
Let Rule define the set of all firewall rules, whereby:
We define a rule interpretation function as:
A firewall policy is defined as a sequence of rules r 1 , r 2 , . ., r n , for r i ∈ Rule, and is encoded in the policy algebra as I(r 1 ) o 9 I(r 2 ) o 9 . . o 9 I(r n ). In practice, firewall policies are often anomalous [44] , where a policy's deny rules are not disjoint from it's allow rules, and a "first match" principle is applied to filtered packets. Mapping a sequence of potentially anomalous firewall rules r 1 , r 2 , . ., r n into the FW 1 algebra gives a semantically-equivalent anomaly-free P ∈ Policy.
Policy Negation. The policy negation of P ∈ Policy allows filter conditions explicitly denied by P and explicitly denies filter conditions allowed by P. We define:
From this definition it follows that (not P) is simply (deny (P), allow (P)) and thus not (Deny D) = (Allow D) and not (Allow A) = (Deny A). Note however, that in general policy negation does not define a complement operator in the algebra FW 1 , that is, it not necessarily the case that (P not P) = and (P not P) = ⊥. However, the sub-lattice of policies with allow and deny sets that exactly partition the same set S FC has policy negation as complement (allow (P) ⊕ deny (P) = S for all P in the sub-lattice).
A Target Action of Log in FW 1 . In this paper, the focus is on firewall rules with a target action of either allow or deny. However, from a compliance perspective, it is considered best practice to log traffic for auditing purposes [41] . Future work should extend the FW 1 algebra to include a target action of log for firewall rules. An approach may be taken, whereby we extend (A, D) ∈ Policy to (A, D, L) ∈ Policy, where L ∈ α[FC] and a filter condition f ∈ L should be logged by the firewall. We give the destructor function log for firewall policies; whereby log (A, D, L) = L. For policy composition, then for P, Q ∈ Policy, we have P Q signifies the operation (log P ⊕ log Q) for logged filter conditions. Similarly, for P Q we have the logged filter conditions (log P ⊗ log Q). From this, we have that the ordering for logged filter conditions is defined similarly to the ordering for denied filter conditions. In practice, a logged filter condition may be shadowed by a filter condition with a target action of allow or deny. However, it is not the case that a filter condition with a target action of log can shadow a filter condition with a target action of allow or deny. Therefore, for sequential composition, then we have P o 9 Q defines the logged filter conditions for the resulting policy as: (log P ⊕ (log Q\ α[fc] (allow P ⊕ deny P))). Encoding a definition for Network Address Translation in FW 1 is also a topic for future research.
Detecting Anomalies in Firewall Policies
A firewall policy is conventionally constructed as a sequence of order-dependent rules, and when a network packet matches with two or more policy rules, the policy is anomalous [2, 3, 10] . By definition, the adjacency-free allow and deny sets of some P ∈ Policy are disjoint, therefore P is anomaly-free by construction. We can however define anomalies using the algebra; by considering how a policy changes when composed with other policies.
Redundancy. A policy P is redundant given policy Q if their composition results in no difference between the resulting policy and Q, in particular, if:
Further definitions may be given for redundancy. For example, there are redundant packets with a target action of allow in filter conditions between policy P and policy Q, if:
as:
A similar interpretation follows for redundant packets with a target action of deny between filter conditions in a policy P and filter conditions in a policy Q. In particular, we have redundant denies if:
Deny(deny (P)) Deny(deny (Q)) = (∅, ∅) as:
Shadowing. Some part of policy Q is shadowed by the entire policy P in the composition P o 9 Q if the by filter condition constraints that are specified by P contradict the constraints that are specified by Q, in particular, if:
This is a very general definition for shadowing. Perhaps a more familiar interpretation of this definition is one where the policy P is a specific allow/deny rule that shadows a part or all of the policy with which it is composed. Recall that (not(Allow A)) = (Deny A) and, for example, in (Allow A) Further definitions may also be given for shadowing. For example, we have that some of the packets denied by filter conditions in a policy P shadow some of the packets allowed by filter conditions in a policy Q if:
Deny(deny (P)) Deny(allow (Q)) = (∅, ∅) as:
Similarly, some of the packets allowed by filter conditions in a policy P shadow some of the packets denied by filter conditions in a policy Q if:
Generalisation. A generalisation anomaly exists between P and Q if some of the packets allowed by filter conditions in P shadow some of the packets denied by filter conditions in Q, in particular, if:
and, those packets shadowed by filter conditions in Q are subsumed by Q's denies:
whereby:
Similarly, a generalisation anomaly exists between P and Q if some of the packets denied by filter conditions in P shadow some of the packets allowed by filter conditions in Q, in particular, if:
and, those packets shadowed by filter conditions in Q are subsumed by Q's allows:
not (Deny(deny (P)) Deny(allow (Q))) = (deny (P) ⊗ allow (Q), ∅)
Inter-policy Anomalies. We can also use the FW 1 algebra to reason about anomalies between the different policies of distributed firewall configurations. In the following, assume that P is a policy on an upstream firewall and Q is a policy on a downstream firewall.
Redundancy. An inter-redundancy anomaly exists between policies P and Q if some part of Q is redundant to some part of P, whereby the target action of the redundant filter conditions is deny. Given some set of filter conditions A denied by P, and some set of filter conditions B denied by Q, then there exists an inter-redundancy between P and Q, if:
Further definitions may be given for inter-redundancy. For example, there are redundant packets with a target action of deny in filter conditions between upstream policy P and downstream policy Q, if:
Shadowing. An inter-shadowing anomaly exists between policies P and Q if some part of Q's allows are shadowed by some part of P's denies. Given some set of filter conditions A denied by P, and some set of filter conditions B allowed by Q, then there is an inter-shadowing anomaly between P and Q, if:
Further definitions may also be given for inter-shadowing. For example, we have that some of the packets denied by filter conditions in a policy P shadow some of the packets allowed by filter conditions in a policy Q if:
Spuriousness. An inter-spuriousness anomaly exists between policies P and Q if some part of Q's denies are shadowed by some part of P's allows. Given some set of filter conditions A allowed by P, and some set of filter conditions B denied by Q, then there exists an inter-spuriousness anomaly between P and Q, if:
Spuriousness may also be defined as follows, whereby some of the packets allowed by filter conditions in a policy P shadow some of the packets denied by filter conditions in a policy Q. We have an interspuriousness anomaly from an upstream policy P to a downstream policy Q, if:
To apply the definitions presented in this section to the detection of anomalies in firewall policies in practice, an approach may be taken, whereby an algorithm is constructed, that incorporates the anomaly definitions into the sequential composition of policies/rules when mapping a potentially anomalous, already deployed firewall policy into FW 1 . That is, given a sequence of firewall rules r 1 , r 2 , . ., r n , then before each sequential composition, an anomaly check can be made using the definitions in this section, the result of which can be used to alert an administrator to the presence of anomalies in the policies/rules under question.
Standards Compliance
RFC 5735 [9] , details fifteen IPv4 address blocks that have been assigned by IANA for specialized/global purposes. Some of these address spaces may appear on the Internet, and may be used legitimately outside a single administrative domain, however, while the assigned values of the address blocks do not directly raise security issues; unexpected use may indicate an attack [9] . For example, packets with a source IP address from the private address space 172.16.0.0/12, arriving on the Wide Area Network interface of a network router, may be considered spoofed, and may be part of a Denial of Service (DoS), or Distributed DoS attack.
RFC 5735 Compliance. Best practice recommendations are implemented for each of the fifteen specialized IP address block ranges in [9] , resulting in one hundred and twenty iptables deny rules. In [18] , we defined this deny ruleset for a firewall management tool. We define IP spoof-mitigation policies for each iptables chain separately. For the INPUT chain, a compliance policy RFC5735 I is defined, whereby for each of the IP address block ranges, the following iptables rules are enforced.
Similarly, for the OUTPUT chain, an IP spoof-mitigation compliance policy RFC5735 O is defined, whereby for each of the specialized IP address block ranges we have:
F enforces the following iptables rules for each of the IP address block ranges.
F , terminates with a final iptables rule that specifies all other traffic be permitted on the given iptables chain.
A Redefined Firewall Policy. We model these iptables rules in the algebra by redefining some policymodel attributes, and provide more formal definitions of RFC5735 I , RFC5735 O and RFC5735 F . Let AdditionalFC I be the set of all duplets for additional filter condition attributes of interest, where:
A revised definition for the set of all filter conditions FC I is given as:
A revised definition for the set of all policies Policy I is given as:
The compliance policies RFC5735 I , RFC5735 O , RFC5735 F ∈ Policy I , define the minimum requirements for what it means for some perimeter network firewall policy to mitigate the threat of IP spoofing for all traffic, in accordance with RFC 5735. Thus, we have for all P ∈ Policy I if:
then P complies with the best practice recommendations outlined in [9] for IP address spoof-mitigation.
Encoding and Evaluating iptables Policies
A prototype policy management toolkit has been implemented in Python for iptables. The prototype allows for parsing the system's currently enforced iptables ruleset r 1 , r 2 . .r n by chain, using the Pythoniptables package [36] , and then normalizing each rule to a primitive/singleton policy. The overall policy for the chain being evaluated as I(r 1 )
Once the sequential composition of the system's currently enforced iptables policy is computed, the prototype generates a semantically-equivalent adjacency-free set of iptables rules and re-writes this new ruleset to the system. We reason over Policy I policies using the o 9 , , and policy operators. The test-bed for the experiments was a 64-Bit Ubuntu 14.04 LTS OS, running on a Dell Latitude E6430, with a quad-core Intel i5-3320M processor and 4GB of RAM. Every experiment was conducted three times; the median result chosen for inclusion in this paper. Overall, the results are promising. In this section, the firewall datatypes for the prototype are described.
Firewall Rules. An iptables rule is modelled as a list of generic filter conditions. The current implementation defines firewall rules with filter condition attributes for source/destination IP/port ranges, the ICMP, UDP and TCP protocols, and additional filter condition attributes. The relationships of adjacency, disjointness and subsumption have been encoded, as have composition operators for rule intersection and rule join/combination.
Range-based Attributes. Filter condition attributes defined as ranges in the FW 1 framework, for example, source/destination IP/port ranges, are implemented as interval sets, using the Pyinter Python package [39] . The package was modified to include definitions for relative compliment operators and adjacency over intervals and interval sets.
ICMP and UDP. The ICMP protocol is modelled as the set of all valid ICMP Type/Code pairs, given in Section 4. UDP has been defined as a binary attribute. Boolean operators apply for the UDP filter condition attributes.
TCP. The TCP protocol is encoded as a 2 12 bit array, whereby the position of each bit is mapped to an index value in a table. This table is the implementation of the Flag Spec object defined in Section 4, and is encoded as the list of TCP (mask, comp) pairs, as pairs of six-bit arrays. A value of 1 at a given position in the 2 12 bit array indicates that this particular arrangement of TCP flags are matched in the packets specified by the firewall rule. Table 3 gives an overview of the FlagSpec lookup.
Additional Attributes. Attributes for direction-oriented filtering, network interface and iptables chains have been encoded as sets for firewall rules. Table   Firewall Policies. A policy is implemented as a disjoint pair of adjacency-free sets of firewall rules. The adjacency-free sets of rules have been modelled following the approach taken to model the intervalsets in the Pyinter package [39] .
Transitive Closure of Adjacent Rules. The transitive closure for the adjacency relation over rules in firewall policies has been implemented recursively, following the approach used in the Pyinter package to implement the transitive closure over adjacent intervals [39] . A set of firewall rules is adjacency-free by construction. When a new rule is added to the ruleset, a check is made firstly to determine if there are any rules in the set that are adjacent to the new rule. If there are none, the new rule is added. Otherwise, the adjacent rules are removed from the ruleset, and rules resulting from the combination of the new rule with the adjacent rules are added to the ruleset, starting again with a check to determine if there are any rules in the set that are adjacent to the new rule.
Evaluating Policy Operators
Evaluating Sequential Policy Composition. The implementation parses the system's currently enforced iptables ruleset r 1 , r 2 . . r n by chain, and then normalizes each rule to a primitive/singleton policy I(r 1 ), I(r 2 ) . . I(r n ) . The overall policy for the chain is evaluated as I(r 1 ) o 9 I(r 2 ) o 9 . . o 9 I(r n ). Two datasets were generated for experimentation. Each dataset consists of iptables policies of size 2 4 . . 2 11 . One dataset contains policies where no rule is adjacent to any other rule (other than itself), and the other dataset consists of policies where every new rule is adjacent to the previous rule; to ensure the maximum number of possible rules are generated as a result of composition. The rules all have a target action of allow. Table 4 details the results for the non-adjacent dataset, while the results for the adjacent dataset are illustrated in Table 5 .
We observe that as the number of rules increase, the cost of computing the sequential composition of non-adjacent rules is relatively cheap, and we see that for the largest ruleset, 2 11 ,the evaluation time is approximately one minute. For the adjacent dataset, the cost of computing the sequential composition of adjacent rules is expensive, but is also proportional to the number of rules used in the experiment. However, the cost is by orders of magnitude more expensive than the cost for evaluating the sequential composition of non-adjacent policies of the same size. For 2 9 rules, the time taken for the evaluation of sequential composition is around three minutes, and the time taken for 2 11 rules is approximately forty six minutes.
Evaluating Policy Union. Experiments were conducted to test policy lub, whereby each policy in the adjacent dataset used in the sequential composition experiments was split into two policies, whereby the first policy contains the odd (index) rules from the original policy, and the second policy contains Table 6 Time taken to compute P Q (in seconds) the even (index) rules from the original policy. The odd (index) policies are adjacency-free, as are the even (index) policies. Constructing the dataset from the odd-index and even-index policies allows us to evaluate the cost, in terms of time, of composing policies of different sizes, whereby for the policy union experiments, the maximum number of rules are generated as a result of composition. For each P, Q ∈ Policy I in this split dataset, the time taken for the operation P Q is given by Table 6 .
A benefit of conducting the policy join experiments in this way, is that in practice, we may want to update a policy P, comprising a large number of rules, with a smaller policy Q that permits some new accesses. The time taken for composition of policies of equal size is approximately the same as (slightly less than) the time necessary to sequentially compose the rules from both policies. That is; for example, the time taken for the sequential composition of 2 9 rules is around three minutes, as is the join of the two policies of size 2 8 . This is highlighted through the diagonal in the matrix, and is as expected; given that we used all allow rules, and the sequential composition of the rules used in these experiments results in the eventual join of the rules.
Evaluating Policy Compliance. A dataset consisting of iptables policies of size 2 5 , 2 6 . .2 11 is generated to test policy compliance. Each policy in this dataset is RFC 5735 compliant by construction, for TCP traffic arriving on the iptables INPUT chain to/from each of the fifteen special-use IPv4 addresses [9] . Recall, the compliance policy RFC5735
I defined in Section 6.2 for Policy I policies. Rules from the previously defined non-adjacent dataset have been re-written with a target action of deny, and are used to construct the remaining rules for each policy in the compliance dataset. For each P in the compliance dataset, the time taken in seconds for the evaluation of P
RFC5735
I is given in Table 7 . We observe that the compliance test has a cheap cost in terms time, and all evaluation times for P RFC5735 I are negligible.
Implementing Duplet Join and Difference
In this section, the Python prototype implementations of duplet/rule join and duplet/rule difference are defined. We demonstrate how Algorithm 1 (duplet join) and Algorithm 2 (duplet difference) relate to firewall rule composition in FW 1 . For ease of exposition, we use colours in tables when illustrating rule/duplet composition. The colours used are of no particular significance. The Python implementation is expected to shortly be uploaded to an open-source repository.
) defines a set of adjacency-free duplets that exactly cover f and g.
The operation is described using three recursive functions; center C(f , g), left L(f , g) and right R(f , g), and is defined as the set union of the duplets resulting from C(f , g), L(f , g) and R(f , g). For ease of exposition, a duplet is given as a sequence of filter condition attributes. We assume f and g always have the same number of attributes. The functions are defined as follows.
) defines the join of the adjacent and common attributes in f and g. For duplets comprising two attributes, we define: Table 9 Center function for three-attribute duplets
Table 10
Left function for two-attribute duplets Table 8 specifies the operations and duplet resulting from C(f , g) for two-attribute duplets. The label D signifies duplet, while A means the attribute. For f and g of length greater than two, we define for each additional attribute: Table 9 specifies the operations and duplet resulting from C(f , g) for duplets with three attributes.
) defines the remaining attribute constraints covered in f , that are not covered in C(f , g). For duplets comprising two attributes, we define: Table 10 specifies the operations and duplet resulting from L(f , g) for two-attribute duplets. For f and g of length greater than two, we define for each additional attribute: Table 11 specifies the operations and duplets resulting from L(f , g) for duplets comprising three attributes.
) defines the remaining attribute constraints covered in g, that are not covered in C(f , g). For duplets comprising two attributes, we define: Table 12 specifies the operations and duplet resulting from R(f , g) for two-attribute duplets. For f and g of length greater than two, we define for each additional attribute:
Table 12
Right function for two-attribute duplets
Table 13
Right function for three-attribute duplets Table 13 specifies the operations and duplets resulting from R(f , g) for duplets comprising three attributes. Thus, we define the combination operation for f and g as:
Theorem 7.1. The duplet combination operation defines the adjacency-free combination for all f , g ∈ δ[X, Y]; n ∈ N, where (n = # f = # g) 2.
Proof We will show that for f , g ∈ δ[X, Y], then f δ[X,Y] g defines the adjacency-free combination for all n ∈ N, where (n = # f = # g) 2, using induction on n.
Base Case. For n = 2, then for f δ[X,Y] g, the resulting operations and duplets for f and g as twoattribute duplets are given in Table 14 . From these results, we have that Theorem 7.1 holds when n = 2.
Inductive Hypothesis. Suppose Theorem 7.1 holds for k ∈ N, where k > n, and k = # f = # g. Then for f δ[X,Y] g, the resulting operations and duplets for f and g as k-attribute duplets are given in Table 15 :
Step. Let n = k + 1. Then by the recursive definitions of C(f , g), L(f , g) and R(f , g), the resulting operations and duplets for f and g as (k + 1)-attribute duplets in (f δ[X,Y] g) are given in Table 16 . Therefore, from these results, we have that Theorem 7.1 holds for n = k + 1. By the principal of mathematical induction, the theorem holds for all n ∈ N, where n 2.
Algorithm 1 summarises the duplet combination operation, whereby the input is a pair of duplets (f , g), the number of attributes (len), and an empty list (ruleSet) to hold the result. The output is the list (ruleSet), whereby ruleSet given in Section 3.3 is constructed following a top-down approach with respect to the ordering relation , whereby:
, we define the implementation definition for sets of adjacency-free duplets as:
Adjacency Duplet Union Implementation. The implementation definition for the join of S, T ∈ α[δ[X, Y]] is defined as the cover-set for the duplet merge of the transitive closure of adjacent duplets, from the coverset for the generalized union of sets from the duplet combination operation ( ), for all transitively adjacent duplets in S and T. The coverset for the the generalized union defines the smallest collection of duplets that cover all of the duplets from both S and T by precedence subsumption. Given that all duplets in this set are now disjoint, the cover-set for the duplet merge of the transitive closure of adjacent duplets merges any forward-adjacent duplets from S and T. If we take some U ∈ α[δ[X, Y]], such that U (S ⊕ T) and S U ∧ T U, then (S ⊕ T) = U. Thus, the implementation definition for duplet Adjacency-set join provides a lowest upper bound operator. if (len == 2) then 3:
return ruleSet 7:
13:
return Combine(f , g, len, ruleSet) 16: end function Theorem 7.2. The two given definitions for joining sets of adjacency-free duplets are equivalent.
Proof Given that both definitions define the cover-set for the duplet merge of the transitive closure of forward adjacent duplets from the smallest collection of disjoint adjacency-free duplets that cover all of the duplets from both S and T by precedence subsumption, then Theorem 7.2 holds.
) defines a set of adjacency-free duplets that are covered by f but not by g. The operation is described using two recursive functions; center
) is defined as the set union of the duplets resulting from C diff (f , g) and L(f , g).
, then for duplets comprising two attributes; C diff (f , g) is defined as follows:
The operations and duplet resulting from C diff (f , g) for two-attribute duplets are given in Table 17 . For f and g of length greater than two, we define for each additional attribute:
Table 17
Center difference function for two-attribute duplets
Table 18
Center difference function for three-attribute duplets The operations and duplet resulting from C diff (f , g) for duplets with three attributes are given in Table 18 . Thus, we define the difference operation for f and g as:
Proof We will show that for
g defines the adjacency-free duplet difference for all n ∈ N, where (n = # f = # g) 2, using induction on n.
Base Case. For n = 2, then for f \ δ[X,Y] g, the resulting operations and duplets for f and g as twoattribute duplets are given in Table 19 . From these results, we have that Theorem 7.3 holds when n = 2.
Inductive Hypothesis. Suppose Theorem 7.3 holds for k ∈ N, where k > n, and k = # f = # g. Then for f \ δ[X,Y] g, the resulting operations and duplets for f and g as k-attribute duplets are given in Table 20 .
of anomalous rules. Yuan et al. [45] present the FIREMAN (FIREwall Modelling ANalysis) tool. Policy configurations are analysed for inconsistencies that consider intra-shadowing, intra-generalisation, intra-correlation and inter-shadowing anomalies [2, 3] . Firewall inefficiency in packet classification and memory consumption is also considered as a result of intra-redundant rules, and 'verbosities', whereby a set of rules may be summarized into a smaller number of rules without changing the filtering semantics of the policy. Chomsiri and Pornavalai [8] propose a method of firewall policy analysis using relational algebra. The definitions provided for intra-redundant and intra-shadowed rules are analogous to [10] , and upon detection, such rules are removed in order to reduce the size of the policy. The definitions given for intra-generalization and intra-correlation are analogous to [2] . Similar to the notion of verbosities in [45] , Chomsiri and Pornavalai propose combining rules that may be 'summarized' without changing the filtering semantics of the policy. Buttyán et al. [7] propose a tool based on FIREMAN [45] for managing anomalies in stateful firewall policies. The authors argue that verifying a stateful firewall for inconsistencies can be reduced to the problem of verifying a stateless firewall for inconsistencies. A limitation of the approach is that their model does not distinguish rules with different state information, that is, for example, there is no differentiation between the establishment and termination phase of a given stateful protocol, and as a consequence, they do not consider more complex anomalies that may occur specifically in the stateful case. Cuppens et al. [11] and García-Alfaro et al. [23] propose an algorithmic approach to detect and resolve anomalies in a stateful firewall policy. A connection-oriented protocol is modelled using general automata, whereby the permitted protocol states and transitions are encoded. Intra-redundant and intra-shadowed rules [10] are considered for the stateful firewall policy. Further definitions are proposed, whereby an intra-state anomaly occurs in a stateful firewall policy if there are policy rules that partially match (complete) the paths of the protocol automata. In the case of missing rules, then covering-rules are suggested to the administrator as a means of completing the path of the protocol automata. Their work also considers invalid protocol states, and inter-state anomalies that may occur in a firewall policy that filters packets against both stateful and stateless rules. The work in [11, 23] also extends the MIRAGE [24] tool. To consider the types of stateful anomalies from [23] in the proposed model FW 1 , then it would be necessary to apply additional constraints when constructing and composing anomaly-free firewall policies. For example, a policy that specifies a firewall rule that enables the establishment of a TCP connection from host X to host Y, should also include rules that allow for the various other permissible transitions of the TCP protocol. Firewall query analysis allows an administrator to pose questions of a policy configuration, such as, for example, "does the policy permit SSH traffic from system X to system Y?". Mayer et al. [35] , present Fang (Firewall ANalysis enGine). Based on graph algorithms and a rule-base simulator, Fang parses vendorspecific firewall policy and configuration files, and constructs a model of the network topology and a global firewall policy for the network. Fang interacts with the administrator through a query-and-answer session, and queries are constructed as triples, consisting of source IPs, destination IPs and endpoint services/ports. Eronen and Zitting [15] propose an expert system for query analysis, implemented in constraint programming logic. A query is constructed as a six-tuple, consisting of source and destination IP and port, network protocol, and flags. The flags attribute is for TCP connections, however, only the SYN and ACK flags are considered. Eronen and Zitting argue that in comparison to Fang [35] , the expert system is a more natural solution for query analysis. Liu et al. [34] present the Structured Firewall Query Language (SFQL), an SQL-like query language. Liu et al. state that constructing an expert system such as [15] "just for analysing a firewall is overwrought and impractical" [34] , however, they do not give their reasoning for this assertion. SFQL queries can be constructed over allow and deny rules for an arbitrary number of filter fields. While query analysis provides an administrator with a means of asking questions of a firewall policy, what can actually be queried is restricted by the collection of filter condition attributes and target actions expressible in the query language. Effective query analysis may be further hampered by the complexity of the query language, or through an administrators inability to construct useful queries. A consequence of the FW 1 algebra proposed in this paper, is that it enables an administrator to perform effective query analysis of a firewall policy configuration. While we do not construct individual high-level queries, we do however demonstrate how policies in the algebra may be tested/queried for compliance with best practice standards and recommendations.
High-level specification languages provide an administrator with the means to reduce the complexity of constructing a firewall policy configuration. Guttman [26] reported some of the earliest research in this area. Bartal et al. [4] present the Firmato toolkit. The proposed specification language allows an administrator to specify the network security policy and the topology for the network in terms of an entity-relationship (ER) model. Subsequently, a policy configuration is synthesised from the ER model. A limitation of the work is that it only applies to packet-filter policy configurations. The High Level Firewall Language (HLFL) [31] translates high-level firewall rules into usable rulesets for iptables, Cisco ACLs, IPFW and others. However, the generated rulesets are order-dependant and may contain anomalies, and the approach does not provide support for incorporating knowledge about a network topology when specifying the high-level rules. Fitzgerald and Foley [17] propose using ontologies to represent knowledge about firewall policy configurations. Policies are specified using Description Logic and SWRL. Semantic Threat Graphs [21] are used to encode catalogues of best practice firewall rules, and an automated synthesis of standards-compliant rules for a policy configuration is considered. However, the administrator must manually construct the rulesets for the catalogues then populate the Semantic Threat Graphs, and this process is error-prone. The proposed model in [17] can also be used for firewall policy query analysis. Adão et al. [1] propose a declarative policy specification language, and present Mignis, a tool that translates high-level access control specifications into low-level policy configurations for Netfilter. An abstract model of the Netfilter firewall is proposed, and definitions for Network Address Translation and stateful filtering are encoded. The synthesised policies consist of order-independent iptables firewall rules. However, the proposed approach is tightly coupled with Netfilter. Brucker et al. [6] present a formal model of both stateless and stateful firewalls, including Network Address Translation. The authors follow a theorem-proving approach to reason about firewall policies, and provide formal and machine-verifiable proof of correctness using the Isabelle theorem prover. Diekmann et al. [14] present a fully verified firewall ruleset analysis framework for iptables, that similar to Brucker et al. [6] , also provides proof of correctness using Isabelle. In this paper, we use the Z notation to provide a consistent syntax for systematically presenting the proposed model FW 1 . Mathematical definitions have been syntax-and type-checked, however the proofs in this paper are of the conventional pen-and-paper variety.
We model a firewall policy as an ordered pair of disjoint adjacency-free sets, where the set of policies Policy forms a lattice under , and each P ∈ Policy is anomaly-free by construction. In [2, 3, 10, 27, 45] an algorithmic approach is taken to detect/resolve anomalies. In contrast, we follow an algebraic approach towards modelling anomalies in a single policy, and across a distributed policy configuration through policy composition. In [46] , a firewall policy algebra is proposed. However, the authors note that an anomaly-free composition is not guaranteed as a result of using their algebraic operators. Our work differs, in that policy composition under the , and o 9 operators defined in this paper all result in anomaly-free policies. In earlier work [22] , we developed the algebra FW 0 , and used it to reason over host-based and network access controls in OpenStack. In the FW 0 algebra, we focused on stateless firewall policies that are defined in terms of constraints on individual IPs, ports and protocols. In this paper, the algebra FW 1 is defined over stateful firewall policies constructed in terms of constraints on source/destination IP/port ranges, the TCP, UDP and ICMP protocols, and additional filter condition attributes. We argue that FW 1 gives a more expressive means for reasoning over OpenStack security group and perimeter firewall configurations. In [30] , cloud calculus is used to capture the topology of cloud computing systems and the global firewall policy for a given configuration. This paper could extend the work in [30] , given that FW 1 may be used in conjunction with cloud calculus to guarantee anomaly-free dynamic firewall policy reconfiguration, whereby the ordering relation may give a viable alternative for the given equivalence relation defined over 'cloud' terms for the formal verification of firewall policy preservation after a live migration. The proposed algebra FW 1 is used to reason about and compose anomaly-free policies and therefore we do not have to worry about dealing with conflicts that may arise. Anomaly conflicts are dealt with in composition by computing anomaly-free policies, rather than using techniques such as [29] to resolve conflicts in policy decisions.
Conclusion
A policy algebra FW 1 is defined in which firewall policies can be specified and reasoned about. At the heart of this algebra is the notion of safe replacement, that is, whether it is secure to replace one firewall policy by another. The set of policies form a lattice under safe replacement and this enables consistent operators for safe composition to be defined. Policies in this lattice are anomaly-free by construction, and thus, composition under glb and lub operators preserves anomaly-freedom. A policy sequential composition operator is also proposed that can be used to interpret firewall policies defined more conventionally as sequences of rules. The algebra can be used to characterize anomalies, such as shadowing and redundancy, that arise from sequential composition. Best practice policy compliance may be defined using . The algebra FW 1 provides a formal interpretation of the network access controls for a partial mapping to the iptables filter table.
FW 1 is a generic algebra and can also be used to model other firewall systems. The results in this paper are described in terms of the algebra FW 1 , for stateful firewall policies that are defined in terms of constraints on source/destination IP/port ranges, the TCP, UDP and ICMP protocols, and additional filter condition attributes.
